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Abstract
An early death is, undoubtedly, a serious disadvantage. However, the com-
pensation of short-lived individuals has remained so far largely unexplored,
probably because it appears infeasible. Indeed, short-lived agents can hardly
be identied ex ante, and cannot be compensated ex post. We argue that, de-
spite the above di¢ culties, a compensation can be carried out by encouraging
early consumption in the life cycle. In a model with heterogeneous preferences
and longevities, we show how a specic social criterion can be derived from
intuitive principles, and we study the corresponding optimal policy under var-
ious informational assumptions. We also study the robustness of our solution
to alternative types of preferences and savings policies.
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1 Introduction
It is undeniably true that an early death constitutes a serious loss, even when it is
due to natural causes. Such a loss should, in a fair society, imply a compensation.
However, the compensation of short-lived persons has remained so far largely un-
explored in policy circles. The absence of debate on that issue is surprising, since
longevity inequalities are widely documented. It is well-known that sizeable longevity
di¤erentials exist even within a given cohort, as shown by Figure 1.1 Although all
cohort members are, by denition, born in the same country and at the same epoch,
there is a substantial dispersion of the age at death, some persons turning out to
have longer lives than others.
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Figure 1: Distribution of the age at death: Swedish female (1900 cohort)
Given that longevity di¤erentials are mainly explained by factors on which indi-
viduals have, on their own, little control, there exists a strong ethical intuition for
compensating short-lived agents, who are, in some sense, victims of the arbitrariness
of Nature.2 Longevity inequalities due to di¤erences in genetic backgrounds are the
best illustration of this. According to Christensen et al (2006), about one quarter to
one third of longevity inequalities within a cohort can be explained by di¤erences in
1Sources: the Human Mortality Data Base (2009).
2Note that longevity is also inuenced by individuals, for instance through their lifestyles (see
Kaplan et al 1987), but those behavioural determinants of longevity (e.g. smoking, diet, physical
activity, etc.) only explain one part of longevity di¤erentials, the rest remaining out of individuals
control (e.g. genetic background, environmental determinants of longevity, etc.).
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the genetic background. Hence there is a strong intuitive support for compensating
the short-lived, who cannot be regarded as responsible for their genes.
But despite the sizeable  and largely arbitrary  longevity di¤erentials, little
attention has been paid to the compensation of short-lived agents. The reason behind
that neglect lies in the apparent impossibility to compensate short-lived individuals.
A rst di¢ culty is that short-lived agents can hardly be identied ex ante. Life-tables
statistics show the distribution of the age at death in a population or a subpopulation
(e.g., by gender), but do not tell us what the longevity of each individual will be.
Another di¢ culty is that, ex post, i.e., once a short-lived person is identied, its well-
being can no longer be a¤ected, so that little compensation can take place at that
stage. Thus we face a non-trivial compensation problem: agents to be compensated
cannot be identied ex ante, and cannot be compensated ex post. Such di¢ culties
may explain why little attention has been paid to the compensation of an early death.
The goal of the present paper is to propose a way to overcome the above di¢ -
culties. For that purpose, the rst part of this paper is devoted to the construction
of a measure of social welfare. The social objective is derived from basic principles
guaranteeing that compensating the agents who turn out to be short-lived would
be desirable. Moreover, the approach, of the "egalitarian-equivalent" type, takes
agentspreferences over longevity into account.3 More precisely, the proposed social
objective evaluates a particular social state by looking at the smallest consumption
the individuals would accept in the replacement of their current situation, if they
could benet from some reference longevity level. In sum, it applies the maximin
criterion to what we call the Constant Consumption Prole Equivalent on the Ref-
erence Lifetime (CCPERL). Hence we shall refer to the social objective we propose
as the Maximin CCPERL.
Once the social objective is dened, it can be used to compute the optimal al-
location of resources in various environments. In the second part of the paper, we
compute the social optimum in a context in which the social planner knows each
individuals preferences and life expectancy, as well as the statistical distribution of
longevities in the population (but not individual longevities). We then also consider
the more relevant second-best context, in which the planner knows the distribution
of all variables (including longevity), but ignores each individuals preferences and
life expectancy. It might seem that very little compensation for a short life can be
made in this case, but the planner can nonetheless improve the lot of the short-lived
agents by inducing everyone to save less than they spontaneously would. One of the
key results of this paper is that it is even possible, in general, to eliminate welfare
3The egalitarian-equivalent approach to equity was rst introduced by Pazner and Schmeidler
(1978).
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inequalities between short-lived and long-lived agents. Admittedly, the correspond-
ing policy may look counterintuitive and is certainly not common. In the conclusion
we discuss the prospects of application of this approach.
Throughout the second part of the paper, we also contrast our egalitarian-equivalent
optimum with the standard utilitarian social objective. This allows us to show how
the Maximin CCPERL avoids the counterintuitive redistributive implications of util-
itarianism in the context of unequal longevities. As shown by Bommier et al (2009,
2010) and Leroux et al (2010), utilitarianism tends, under standard assumptions
like time-additive lifetime welfare and expected utility hypothesis, to redistribute
resources from short-lived agents towards long-lived agents, which is undesirable.4
Our approach is, in this light, more intuitive and attractive than utilitarianism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the framework.
Section 3 derives a social objective from ethical axioms. Section 4 compares the
Maximin CCPERL solution with the utilitarian solution in the rst best context.
Then, Section 5 explores the second-best problem, in which the agentscharacteristics
are not known to the planner. Section 6 explores some generalizations and evaluates
the robustness of the Maximin CCPERL solution to various assumptions, such as
the reference longevity level and the savings policies. Section 7 concludes.
2 The framework
The model describes the situation of a given nite population of agents with ordinal
preferences over lifetime consumption proles. We consider a pure exchange economy,
because the central tenets of the compensation problem can be captured in absence
of production.
The set of natural integers (resp., real numbers) is denoted N (resp., R). Let
N be the set of individuals, with cardinality jN j. The maximum possible lifespan
for any individual, i.e., the maximum number of periods that can ever be lived, is
denoted by T , with T 2 N and T > 1.
Each individual will have a particular lifetime consumption prole. Under the
assumption of non-negative consumptions, a lifetime consumption prole for an in-
dividual i 2 N is a vector of dimension T or less, that is, it is an element xi in the
set X =
ST
`=1R`+. The longevity of an individual i with consumption prole xi is
4This anti-redistributive bias is due to Gossens First Law, and is robust to various specications
of lifetime welfare. In particular, as shown by Leroux and Ponthiere (2010), representing lifetime
welfare as a concave transform of the sum of temporal utilities only mitigates  but does not
eradicate  the utilitarian tendency to redistribute resources to the long-lived.
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dened by a function  : X ! N, such that  (xi) is the dimension of the lifetime
consumption prole, that is, the length of existence of individual i.
An allocation denes a consumption prole for each individual in the population
N . Formally, an allocation for N is a vector xN := (xi)i2N 2 X jN j:
Each individual i 2 N has well-dened preferences over the set of lifetime con-
sumption proles X. His preferences are described by an ordering Ri (i.e. a reexive,
transitive and complete binary relation). For all xi 2 X, the indi¤erence set at xi for
Ri is dened as I(xi; Ri) := fyi 2 X j yiIixig. For any lives xi and yi of equal length,
preference orderings on xi and yi are assumed to be continuous, convex and weakly
monotonic (i.e. xi  yi implies xiRiyi and xi  yi implies xiPiyi).5 Moreover,
we assume that for all xi 2 X; there exists (c; :::; c) 2 RT+ such that xiIi (c; :::; c) ;
which means that no lifetime consumption prole is worse or better than all lifetime
consumption proles with full longevity. This excludes lexicographic preferences for
which longevity is an absolute good or bad. Let < be the set of all preference order-
ings on X satisfying these properties. A preference prole for N is a list of preference
orderings of the members of N , denoted RN := (Ri)i2N 2 <jN j.
Figure 2 shows an example of agentspreferences in a two-period setting, i.e. for
xi 2 R+ [ R2+. An agent who lives the rst period only remains on the horizontal
axis (i.e. second period consumption is zero). The dashed line segments mean that
the individual is indi¤erent between the two extreme points of the line segment.
The upper end of the dashed segment gives the (constant) consumption that should
be given to the agent in each period of a hypothetical two-period life to make him
exactly as well-o¤ as he is with a single period of life.
Figure 2 illustrates that, to keep the same satisfaction level while raising the
length of life, what is required may possibly be either a smaller or a larger consump-
tion per period, depending on the consumption enjoyed while having a short life. For
a short-lived individual whose consumption is high (i.e. at the right of the horizontal
axis), the consumption that should be given to him in a two-period life to make him
indi¤erent with its current state, which is given by the end of the dashed segment,
would be much smaller than its current consumption. This reects the attractiveness
of a longer life for a person with a high current standard of living. On the contrary,
for a short-lived agent whose consumption is low (i.e. at the left of the horizontal
axis), the consumption that should be given to him in a two-period life to make him
indi¤erent with its current state might be larger than his current consumption. His
low current consumption puts him in such a misery that the lengthening of his life
5Note that we do not assume those properties for lives with di¤erent lengths. For instance,
requiring that the three-periods life (2; 2; 1) be necessarily better than the two-period life (2; 2)
would be too strong. One may prefer death to an additional period with consumption equal to 1.
5
-
c
6d
0
Figure 2: Indi¤erence curves in (c; d) space
with the same consumption per period would make him worse o¤. Hence additional
consumption per period is needed to compensate him for having a longer life.
Clearly, all allocations are not equivalent in terms of how short-lived agents are
treated. Therefore, in order to provide theoretical foundations to the compensation
of short-lived persons, it is necessary to dene social preferences over allocations.
Such social preferences will serve to compare allocations in terms of their goodness
and fairness. Those social preferences will be formalized by a social ordering function
% which associates every admissible preference prole RN of the population with an
ordering %RN dened on the set of all possible allocations for N , that is, an ordering
dened on X jN j. For all xN ; yN 2 X jN j, xN %RN yN means that the allocation xN is,
under the preference prole RN , at least as good as the allocation yN . The symbols
RN and RN will denote strict preference and indi¤erence, respectively.
3 The social objective
This section aims at deriving a social objective that is adequate for the allocation of
resources among agents having unequal longevities. As mentioned above, standard
social objectives like utilitarianism do not do justice to basic intuitions supporting
the compensation of the short-lived, so that we need to look for other objectives.
Obviously, there exist many possible social preferences. The only way to select
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reasonable social preferences is to impose some plausible ethical requirements that
these should satisfy. Such ethical requirements will take here the form of four axioms.
The rst axiom states that if all individuals prefer one allocation to another, then
this should also be regarded as socially preferable to that alternative.
Axiom 1 (Weak Pareto) For all preference proles RN 2 <jN j, all allocations
xN ; yN 2 X jN j, if xiPiyi for all i 2 N , then xN RN yN .
That axiom can be justied on two grounds. First, it seems essential to respect
individual preferences in order to address trade-o¤s between, for instance, consump-
tion at di¤erent points in life. Second, the Pareto axiom is also a guarantee against
the choice of ine¢ cient allocations: it states that any unanimity in the population
regarding the ranking of two allocations should be respected by social preferences.
The next axiom requires social preferences to use the relevant kind of information
about individual preferences. More precisely, it states that, in order to compare
allocations for a given individual, it is su¢ cient to look at the indi¤erence sets of the
individual at the consumption proles under consideration.
Axiom 2 (Hansson Independence) For all preferences proles RN ; R0N 2 <jN j
and for all allocations xN ; yN 2 X jN j, if for all i 2 N , I(xi; Ri) = I (xi; R0i) and
I(yi; Ri) = I (yi; R
0
i), then xN %RN yN if and only if xN %R0N yN .
This condition, which was rst introduced by Hansson (1973) and Pazner (1979),
requires that social preferences over two allocations depend only on the individual
indi¤erence curves at these allocations. Note, however, that those indi¤erence curves
contain more information than individual pairwise preferences over these two alloca-
tions. This allows us to avoid Arrows impossibility result.
The next two axioms are renements of the Pigou-Dalton principle in the context
of unequal longevities.
The Pigou-Dalton principle for Equal Preferences and Equal Lifetimes is an im-
mediate translation of the Pigou-Dalton principle in the present context. It states
that, if we take two allocations such that the consumption proles are exactly the
same under the two allocations for everyone except for two persons, then, if those two
individuals have equal lifetimes and equal preferences, the allocation in which the
two agents have, when alive, closer consumption proles is more socially desirable
than the one in which they have more unequal consumption proles.
Axiom 3 (Pigou-Dalton for Equal Preferences and Equal Lifetimes) For all
RN 2 <jN j, all xN , yN 2 X jN j, and all i, j 2 N , if Ri = Rj and if  (xi) =  (yi) =
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 (xj) =  (yj) = `, and if there exists  2 R`++ such that
yi  xi = yi     xj = yj +   yj
and xk = yk for all k 6= i; j, then
xN %RN yN :
That axiom is pretty intuitive: for agents who are identical in terms of every-
thing (i.e. longevities, preferences) except their consumptions, a redistribution from
the agent with the higher consumption to the agent with the lower consumption
constitutes a social improvement.
While that rened version of the Pigou-Dalton principle is intuitive, it is nonethe-
less restricted to agents with equal preferences, which is a strong restriction. Actu-
ally, we would like also to be able to say whether a consumption transfer is a social
improvement or not when agents have di¤erent preferences. Note, however, that
making this kind of statement is not trivial, as it is not obvious to see in which
case some consumption transfer from a rich to a poor could be regarded as a social
improvement whatever individual preferences are.
In the following axiom, it is argued that, if the two agents in question have a
longevity that is equal to a level of reference `, then a transfer that lowers the
constant consumption prole of the rich and raises the constant consumption prole
of the poor constitutes a social improvement, whatever individual preferences are.
Axiom 4 (Pigou-Dalton for Constant Consumption and Reference Lifetime)
For all RN 2 <jN j, all xN , yN 2 X jN j, and all i, j 2 N , such that  (xi) =  (yi) =
 (xj) =  (yj) = `
, and xi and xj are constant consumption proles, if there exists
 2 R`++ such that
yi  xi = yi     xj = yj +   yj
and xk = yk for all k 6= i; j, then
xN %RN yN :
The reference longevity level ` can be interpreted in the following way. An ex-
ternal observer could, when comparing the lives of two persons with the same length
`, say who is better o¤ than the other by just looking at the constant consumption
proles of those agents, without knowing anything about their preferences. Thus, `
is the length of life such that if it is enjoyed by distinct persons, one can compare
the well-being of those agents directly from their consumptions (provided they are
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constant over time), without caring for their preferences. Note that this axiom is
weak. It would be tempting to extend it to cases in which the longevity of the agents
can take other values than a particular ` : isnt it intuitive that a greater constant
consumption for any given longevity makes one better o¤? Unfortunately, such an
extension would render the axiom incompatible with Weak Pareto.6 This is why the
axiom can be formulated for at most one reference level of longevity.
There is no need, at this stage, to assign a specic level to the reference longevity
`. Intuitively, it makes sense to set ` at the "normal" lifespan, that is, the lifespan
that everyone  whatever ones life-plans are  would like to have, but it is not
trivial to see which lifespan is the normal one. Note that the selection of ` may
have important redistributive consequences, in combination with the Pareto axiom.
Taking, for instance, a maximal lifespan of 120 years as the reference would imply
giving priority to those who have a strong preference for longevity. This is because
their situation is equivalent, according to their own preferences, to a situation in
which they live for 120 years with a low consumption. Given that the "normal"
lifespan may vary with the circumstances  in particular with the quality of life
(health status)  , we will not x it, and keep it as an ethical parameter.7
The four ethical principles that are presented above seem quite reasonable. We
now have to investigate which kind of social preferences do satisfy these conditions.
As we shall see, the answer to that question will be quite precise. But before providing
that answer, let us rst introduce what we shall call the Constant Consumption
Prole Equivalent on the Reference Lifetime (CCPERL).
Denition 1 (Constant Consumption Prole Equivalent on the Reference Lifetime)
For any i 2 N , any Ri 2 < and any xi 2 X, the Constant Consumption Prole
Equivalent on the Reference Lifetime (CCPERL) of xi is the constant consumption
prole x^i such that (x^i) = ` and
xiIix^i:
The CCPERL can be interpreted as a way to homogenize consumptions across
individuals having di¤erent longevities, by converting consumptions under di¤erent
longevities into some comparable consumptions. The intuition behind that homoge-
nization exercise is the following. In the present context, where agents have unequal
6Such an incompatibility between the Pareto principle and the principle of transfer in the multi-
dimensional context is well documented. See, e.g., Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011). Intuitively, the
problem stems from the fact that, at a low common level of longevity, making a progressive transfer
from an individual who cares a lot about longevity to another who cares less about longevity may
be Pareto equivalent to a regressive transfer at a greater level of longevity  their indi¤erence
curves crossing at an intermediate level of longevity.
7It is indeed likely that societies with a better health will consider that ` is larger.
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longevities, looking at individual consumption proles does not su¢ ce to have a pre-
cise idea of individual well-being. However, the CCPERL does allow to have a more
precise view, as it has, by construction, taken longevity di¤erentials into account.
It is trivial to see that, if xi is a constant consumption prole with (xi) = ` = `,
then x^i = xi. However, if xi is a constant consumption prole (with consumption
level for each life-period equal to ci) with ` < `, then we have x^i ? (ci; :::; ci),
depending on whether ci lies above or below the critical level making a longer life
with that consumption worth being lived. The CCPERL of xi always exists if ` = T;
by assumption made on <; but the existence of the CCPERL is not guaranteed if
` < T: It may happen that xi with high longevity is strictly preferred to all lifetime
consumption proles with lower longevity `: When this happens, we adopt the
convention that the CCPERL is innite. This problem of non-existence is not very
important as the social preferences highlighted here focus on the worst-o¤individuals.
Having dened the CCPERL, we can now present the following theorem, which
characterizes the social preferences, or, more precisely, states that the Maximin on
CCPERL is a necessary condition for social optimality.
Theorem 1 Assume that the social ordering function % satises Axioms 1-2-3-4 on
<jN j. Then % is such that for all RN 2 <jN j, all xN , yN 2 X jN j,
min
i2N
(x^i) > min
i2N
(y^i) =) xN RN yN :
In other words, the social ordering satises the Maximin property on the Constant
Consumption Prole Equivalent on the Reference Lifetime (CCPERL).
The proof is in the Appendix. It should be noted that this theorem does not give
a full characterization of social preferences because it does not say how to compare
allocations for which min (x^i) = min (y^i).8 All the theorem states is that if one
allocation exhibits a higher minimum CCPERL than another, then it must also be
socially more desirable. In other words, the theorem implies that maximizingmin (x^i)
is a necessary operation, as the best social allocation is necessarily included in the
set of allocations that maximize min (x^i).
However, this result tells us a lot about social preferences. True, if the set of allo-
cations that maximize min (x^i) is not a singleton, looking at the minimum CCPERL
only would not tell us which allocation is the most desirable. However, in more
8Clearly, given the postulated axioms, the equality of the min (x^i) for two allocations does not
necessarily imply social indi¤erence between these allocations: an allocation could still be regarded
as better than the other (on the grounds of other aspects of the distribution), and the theorem has
nothing to say about that.
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concrete problems, it is likely that the Maximin on CCPERL has, as a solution, a
unique allocation, in which case that allocation must also be the most socially desir-
able allocation. When a unique solution is not obtained, it is natural to rene the
Maximin into the Leximin, which extends the lexicographic priority of the worse-o¤
to higher ranks in the distribution.
While the details of the proof are provided in the Appendix, its overall form can
be briey given here. The proof proceeds in two stages. In a rst stage, it is shown
that Weak Pareto, Hansson Independence and Pigou-Dalton for Equal Preferences
and Equal Lifetimes imply Hammond Equity for Equal Preferences. That principle
states that, if two persons i and j have the same preferences, but i lies on a higher
indi¤erence curve than j, pushing i on a lower indi¤erence curve and j on a higher
one is socially desirable. This embodies an absolute priority for the worst-o¤. In a
second stage, Hammond Equity for Equal Preferences is then used to show that, if
we add Pigou-Dalton for Constant Consumption and Reference Lifetime, we obtain
Hammond Equity for Reference Lifetime. According to that principle, if two persons
i and j, possibly with di¤erent preferences, have the same longevity equal to the
reference `, but i has a higher constant consumption prole than j, then lowering
the constant consumption prole of i and raising the one of j is socially desirable.
Let us note that an alternative characterization can be made in a slightly di¤erent
setting. Suppose for the rest of this section that longevity is a continuous variable, so
that a lifetime consumption prole is now described as a function xi(t) dened over
the interval [0; T ] :We restrict attention to functions xi(t) which are strictly positive
and continuous over an interval [0;  (xi)] and null over the complement ( (xi) ; T ] :
The corresponding longevity is obviously  (xi). Individual preferences over lifetime
consumption proles xi can still be dened and assumed to be convex, continuous
(with respect to the topology of pointwise convergence) and weakly monotonic. The
axioms of Weak Pareto and Hansson Independence are immediately adapted to this
setting. Let us now introduce a new axiom which states that, whatever the individual
preferences, it is always socially desirable to reduce longevity inequalities among
agents who enjoy the same consumption per life-period, when one agent lives longer
than ` and the other has a shorter life. For this axiom not to be idle, it must be
assumed that 0 < ` < T: A similar assumption was not needed with the axiom of
Pigou-Dalton for Constant Consumption and Reference Lifetime.
Axiom 5 (Inequality Reduction around Reference Lifetime) For all RN 2
<jN j, all xN , yN 2 X jN j, and all i, j 2 N , such that  (xi) = `i,  (yi) = `0i,
 (xj) = `j and  (yj) = `0j, and some c 2 R++ is the same constant per-period level
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of consumption for xi; yi; xj; yj; if
`j; `
0
j  `  `i; `0i and `j   `0j = `0i   `i > 0
and xk = yk for all k 6= i; j, then
xN %RN yN :
That axiom is quite attractive: reducing longevity inequalities between long-
lived and short-lived agents who enjoy equal consumptions per period can hardly
be regarded as undesirable. Note, however, that the attractiveness of that axiom is
not independent from the monotonicity of preferences in longevity. If consumption
per period is so low that some agents may prefer having a short rather than a long
life, reducing longevity inequalities by raising the longevity of the short-lived may
be socially undesirable. Thus this axiom, unlike axioms 3 and 4, must be used in a
subdomain of preferences satisfying a stronger monotonicity condition with respect
to longevity.
Observe that by weak monotonicity, for every individual preference ordering Ri
and every lifetime consumption prole xi; there is a unique constant prole with
same longevity such that every prole with greater consumption and same longevity
is strictly preferred and every prole with lower consumption and same longevity
is strictly worse. Therefore, by Weak Pareto one can restrict attention to constant
lifetime consumption proles and work with bundles having two dimensions, namely,
per-period consumption and longevity. Formally, Inequality Reduction around Ref-
erence Lifetime is then similar to the Free Lunch Aversion Condition proposed by
Maniquet and Sprumont (2004) in the context of public goods provision. It is then a
simple adaptation of their analysis to show that the conclusion of Theorem 1 holds
in this particular setting when it is required that the social ordering function must
obey the axioms 1-2-5. The only minor di¤erence is that longevity is here bounded
between 0 and T; whereas the corresponding variable (contribution of private good
to the production of public good) is unbounded in their model.9
9Although Inequality Reduction around Reference Lifetime is meaningful in the model of this
paper introduced in Section 2, Th. 1 does not hold with axioms 1-2-5, even with stronger monotonic-
ity assumptions about individual preferences. The reason is that if the worst-o¤ gains very little,
this may not be equivalent to gaining one period of longevity at any level of consumption. Axiom
5 is then powerless because it applies only when the worst-o¤ in the "transfer" of longevity gains
at least one period of additional longevity.
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4 First-best optimum
The previous section showed that basic axioms on social preferences imply that
the optimal allocation must maximize the minimum CCPERL in the population.
What are the consequences of this result on the optimum allocation of resources?
If, for instance, a social planner could have anticipated, in 1900, the distribution of
longevities of Swedish women as shown on Figure 1, how should he have allocated a
xed amount of resources among the cohort members?
This section aims at characterizing the social optimum in a resource allocation
problem when the axioms of Theorem 1 are satised. We will also contrast this
social optimum with the utilitarian optimum, to see what kinds of compensations
the Maximin on CCPERL implies in contrast with the utilitarian allocation.
For such purposes, let us consider a simple model where agents live either one
or two periods.10 The length of life of each agent is only known ex post. Ex ante,
the social planner knows individual preferences and life expectancies, as well as the
statistical distribution of longevity in the population, and looks for the optimum
allocation of an endowment W of resources.
Individual lifetime welfare takes a standard time-additive form:
U1ij = u(cij);
U2ij = u(cij) + iu(dij);
EUij = u(cij) + jiu(dij);
where cij and dij denote rst-period and second-period consumptions of an agent
with a time preference factor i and a survival probability j, while U
1
ij and U
2
ij
denote his actual lifetime utility if he lives respectively one or two periods, and EUij
is the corresponding expected utility. Temporal utility u() takes the same form for
everyone.11
Heterogeneity here takes the following form. Ex ante, agents di¤er in their at-
titude towards the future, i.e. in their time preferences, i, and in their survival
probabilities, j, with two types for each parameter:
0 < 1 < 2 < 1;
0 < 1 < 2 < 1:
10The assumption T = 2 is here made for analytical simplicity. We discuss below how robust our
results are to assuming T > 2.
11As usual, we assume: u0(cij) > 0 and u00(cij) < 0:
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Hence, there exist 4 types of agents ex ante, who are di¤erentiated by their i and
j. Ex post, there are 8 types of agents, as each ex ante type includes short-lived
and long-lived agents.12
For the sake of presentation, we here adopt three assumptions which will be re-
laxed later on (see Section 6). First, we assume that u(0) > 0, so that it is always
strictly better to be long-lived rather than short-lived. Note that this assumption
is not the standard one (see Becker et al. 2005), but it greatly simplies the com-
putation of optimal allocations. Second, we assume that the social planner faces a
unique intertemporal resource constraint, in the sense that he can allocate resources
as rst-period or second-period consumptions without any cost. Third, we assume
that agents cannot transfer resources across periods, so that the bundles (received
from the planner) have to be consumed in the same periods as they are received,
without any possibility, at the individual level, to reallocate resources over time.
Within that framework, the problem of the social planner consists in o¤ering
four consumption bundles (cij; dij) to agents with time preference parameter i and
survival probability j, for i = 1; 2 and j = 1; 2. Note that these bundles do not
depend on whether agents live one or two periods, as the actual length of life is not
known ex ante by the planner.
In the following, we rst solve the problem faced by a utilitarian planner, and
then, we contrast it with the Maximin on CCPERL, assuming that the planner can
observe characteristics i and j. We relax this assumption in Section 5.
4.1 Utilitarian optimum
The problem of the utilitarian social planner amounts to selecting bundles (cij; dij) in
such a way as to maximize social welfare ex post, subject to the resource constraint:13
max
c11;c12;c21;c22
d11;d12;d21;d22
u (c11) + 11u (d11) + u (c21) + 12u (d21)
+u (c12) + 21u (d12) + u (c22) + 22u (d22)
s.to c11 + 1d11 + c21 + 1d21 + c12 + 2d12 + c22 + 2d22  W
From the rst-order conditions, we obtain that the optimal allocation is such that
c11 = c

12 = c

21 = c

22 > d

21 = d

22 > d

11 = d

12:
For every agent, the rst-period consumption exceeds the second-period consump-
tion, since i < 1. Moreover, the rst-period consumption is equalized across all
12For simplicity, we assume that there is a mass 1 of individuals in each of the ex ante groups.
13In the rest of this paper, we shall refer to classical utilitarianism as merely utilitarianism.
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agents. On the contrary, the second-period consumption is di¤erentiated according
to their time preferences, but not according to their survival probabilities. Hence, the
second-period consumption is higher for agents with a higher i, but is independent
from j.14
Regarding the ranking of agents in terms of ex post lifetime welfare, it is clear that
the worst-o¤agents are the short-lived, followed by 1-type agents living two periods.
The best-o¤ agents are the 2-type agents living two periods.
15 The utilitarian
optimum thus tends to favour long-lived agents over short-lived agents, and patient
agents (i.e 2-type) over impatient agents (i.e. 1-type).
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4.2 Maximin on CCPERL
Let us now contrast the utilitarian optimum with the Maximin on CCPERL. For
that purpose, we will take the maximum length ` = 2 as a reference level `. By
denition, the CCPERL for an agent of type (i; j) with an actual length of life
` = 1; 2 is the constant consumption prole x^ij` = (c^ij`; c^ij`) such that:
u (c^ij2) + iu (c^ij2) = u (cij) + iu (dij)
u (c^ij1) + iu (c^ij1) = u (cij)
On the rst line, c^ij2 denes the consumption equivalent of an agent with time
preference i and survival probability j who e¤ectively lived two periods, while the
second line denes a consumption equivalent c^ij1 for a (i; j)-type agent living only
one period. Note that since we take ex-post utilities on the right-hand side of these
expressions, the CCPERL of an agent does not depend on his survival probability.17
Let us rst dene the consumption equivalent x^ij` = (c^ij`; c^ij`) for each of the 8
groups of individuals that emerge ex post.
14This result is due to the fact that the survival probability j enters the social objective and
the budget constraint in the same way.
15Note that since di¤erences in survival do not a¤ect the optimum, this ranking is similar to the
one we would obtain if there was no di¤erence in survival chances.
16This results follows from the additivity of (1) the utilitarian social welfare function and (2)
individual lifetime welfare (see Bommier et al. 2009, 2010). Note, however, that relaxing (2) would
not eradicate the utilitarian tendency to favour the long-lived (see Leroux and Ponthiere 2010).
17Thus we would obtain the same CCPERL if agents did not di¤er in survival chances.
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  ` def. CCPERL c^ij`
1 1 1 u (c^111) (1 + 1) = u (c11)
1 2 1 u (c^121) (1 + 1) = u (c12)
2 1 1 u (c^211) (1 + 2) = u (c21)
2 2 1 u (c^221) (1 + 2) = u (c22)
1 1 2 u (c^112) (1 + 1) = u (c11) + 1u (d11)
1 2 2 u (c^122) (1 + 1) = u (c12) + 1u (d12)
2 1 2 u (c^212) (1 + 2) = u (c21) + 2u (d21)
2 2 2 u (c^222) (1 + 2) = u (c22) + 2u (d22)
Table 1: Denition fo the consumption equivalents
To nd the bundles that maximize the minimum CCPERL, we rst need to
identify the worst-o¤ agents. We can rst note that, as u(0) > 0, short-lived agents
are worse-o¤ than long-lived agents of the same type, as death prevented them from
enjoying the second period (which is positively valued). From this, it follows that
the allocation that satises the Maximin on CCPERL is obtained by transferring
second-period resources to the rst period, i.e. by decreasing dij to 0:
d11 = d

12 = d

21 = d

22 = 0:
Second, the CCPERL can be equalized among short-lived agents by increasing c2j
and decreasing c1j until one reaches c^111 = c^121 = c^211 = c^221. This is obtained by
setting c11 = c

12 < c

21 = c

22. Hence, rst-period consumption is larger for patient
agents (i.e. with a high i) as they are more a¤ected by a short life than impatient
agents (i.e. with a low i). Thus, to compensate them, more consumption in the rst
period is needed. This justies the di¤erentiated treatment in terms of consumption
between agents with di¤erent time preferences. We obtain the following ranking:
c^111 = c^121 = c^211 = c^221 < c^112 = c^122 < c^212 = c^222
under our assumption u (0) > 0. Thus, whereas the Maximin on CCPERL enables
us to make some compensation of short-lived individuals, this does not, however,
imply a full compensation, because the social planner cannot, ex ante, know the
actual lengths of life. Moreover, as the above ranking shows, among the long-lived
agents, there is also an inequality due to the larger benet of living longer for patient
agents.18
18Indeed one has, at the solution of the Maximin on CCPERL that,
u (c^112) =
u (c11) + 1u (0)
1 + 1
< u (c^212) =
u (c21) + 2u (0)
1 + 2
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Note that the social planner does not use the information on survival probabilities
j to o¤er distinct consumption bundles to agents with di¤erent life expectancies.
As mentioned earlier, this uniform treatment of agents with di¤erent j comes from
the fact that survival probabilities do not inuence the CCPERL, which is dened
ex post, that is, once the risk of death has been resolved.19 What we do here is to
compensate short-lived agents, independently of how unlucky their death was.
All in all, this solution di¤ers strongly from the utilitarian optimum, under which
the optimal bundles included a positive consumption in the second period. The
following proposition sums up the results of this section.
Proposition 1 Assume that u(0) > 0, and that the social planner faces a unique in-
tertemporal budget constraint. Under perfect information about ex-ante types (i; j):
 Utilitarianism equalizes rst-period consumptions for all agents at a level that
exceeds second-period consumptions. Agents with a low impatience benet from
a higher second-period consumption.
 Maximin CCPERL involves higher rst-period consumptions for patient agents,
and lower rst-period consumptions for impatient agents. Second-period con-
sumptions are all set to zero.
 Under both criteria, agents who di¤er in their survival probabilities but have
the same preferences are treated identically. The introduction of heterogeneity
in survival probabilities does not alter the optimal allocation.
5 Second-best optimum
Up to now, we assumed that individual characteristics i and j were perfectly ob-
servable by the social planner. This section reexamines the utilitarian and egalitarian-
equivalent solutions under asymmetric information, that is, when agents know their
(i; j)-type, while the government only observes the distributions of types. The
government can still propose di¤erent bundles to ex ante groups, but under the
constraint of incentive compatibility.
with c11 < c21 and 1 < 2. The same reasoning applies for u (c^122) < u (c^222).
19Note that this result is robust to the sign of u(0), which does not need to be positive.
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5.1 Utilitarian optimum
As we saw above, the utilitarian planner does not want, under perfect information, to
give priority to agents on the basis of their survival probability: agents di¤ering only
in j were all treated equally in the rst-best utilitarian optimum. However, under
asymmetric information, one cannot exclude a priori a di¤erentiation of bundles on
the basis of j. Indeed, survival probabilities j now a¤ect also the planners problem
by their presence in the incentive compatibility constraints.
To study the utilitarian problem under asymmetric information, we shall, for
simplicity, focus here on the case where the di¤erence in patience looms larger than
the di¤erence in survival probabilities:
11 < 21 < 12 < 22
The agentspreferences satisfy the single-crossing property in the corresponding or-
der. If the social planner proposed the rst-best allocation, 1-type agents would
like to mimic 2-type agents, independently of their survival chances. Hence, using
also the above inequalities, the relevant incentive compatibility conditions are:20
u (c11) + 11u (d11)  u (c12) + 11u (d12) ;
u (c12) + 21u (d12)  u (c21) + 21u (d21) ;
u (c21) + 12u (d21)  u (c22) + 12u (d22) :
Under the single-crossing property, these three incentive compatibility constraints
su¢ ce to avoid any mimicking behaviour. Intuitively, it must be the case that
the optimal second-best allocation is such that agents with type (1; 1) receive the
highest rst-period consumption and the lowest second-period consumption, followed
by the other types as follows:
c11  c12  c21  c22;
d11  d12  d21  d22:
20If agents had the same survival chances, there would be only one incentive constraint,
u (c1) + 1u (d1)  u (c2) + 1u (d2) ;
This ensures that impatient agents would not mimic patient ones under asymmetric information.
As usual in this type of problem, the allocation of the mimicker (with time preference 1) would
not be distorted. But the second-period consumption of 2-type agents would increase and their
rst-period consumption would decrease with respect to the rst-best, in such a way as to relax an
(otherwise binding) self-selection constraint. Hence, we would have: d1 < c

1, c

2 < c

1 and c

2 7 d2:
18
Let us now check whether the planner, in contrast with the rst-best optimum,
wants to di¤erentiate between agents on the basis of their survival probabilities. The
problem of the planner is equivalent to the rst-best problem, to which we add the
above incentive constraints. Rearranging the FOCs of the (1; 1)-type agents, we
obtain the usual result of no distortion at the top for the extreme mimicker:
u0(c11) = 1u
0(d11):
This trade-o¤, which is similar to the one we had in the rst-best, yields c11 > d11.
On the contrary, for other agents (and eliminating from these equations the Lagrange
multiplier associated with the resource constraint), we now have:
u0 (c12)
1u
0 (d12)
=
1  1 12 + 2
1  1 + 2
u0 (c21)
2u
0 (d21)
=
1  2 2112 + 3
1  2 + 3
u0 (c22)
2u
0 (d22)
=
1  3 12
1  3
:
where k; k = 1; 2; 3 are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the incentive
compatibility constraints. The possibility of mimicking behaviors then leads the
planner to give distinct bundles to agents who have not only di¤erent time preferences
but also di¤erent survival chances. For instance, bundles (c11; d11) and (c12; d12) are
di¤erent whenever the (corresponding) rst incentive constraint is binding (i.e. 1 >
0). However, from these equations it is impossible to exclude the possibility of
bunching among the other agents.
Let us now see how these incentive constraints modify the optimal allocation of
each type. As the right-hand sides of these expressions are all greater than one,
incentive constraints push toward more consumption in the second period for all
types, in such a way as to discourage these agents from pretending to be "apparently
patient" (apparent patience may be due to a high i or a high j). To see this, let us
study the rst equation. The trade-o¤ between (c12; d12) is distorted upward so as to
avoid mimicking from (1; 1)-type agents. Indeed, it is optimal to encourage second-
period consumption for (1; 2)-type agents as compared to the rst-best trade-o¤,
in order to discourage (1; 1)-type agents from pretending to be of that type. By
doing so, this bundle becomes less interesting to (1; 1)-type agents, as they would
obtain too much consumption in the second period and not enough in the rst one,
given that they face a lower survival chance 1 < 2. Hence, if 1 = 2, (1; 1)-
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type agents and (1; 2)-type agents would be identical, and we would obtain the
rst-best trade-o¤.21
In comparison with the rst-best, the relative di¤erence between rst-period and
second-period consumptions is lower, as the introduction of incentive constraints
pushes towards more consumption in the second period. Yet, very little can be said
on welfare inequalities between agents with di¤erent types. As compared to the rst-
best, short-lived agents are no longer treated equally, as rst-period consumptions
may now be di¤erent for individuals with di¤erent (i; j).
Moreover, under asymmetric information, short-lived agents are still worse-o¤
than the long-lived, and this inequality may even be increased by the introduction
of incentive constraints, as it encourages consumption in the second period. Also,
among long-lived agents, it is not sure who would end up with the highest welfare.
5.2 Maximin on CCPERL
As in the rst-best, we take the maximum length ` = 2 as the reference level `
for dening the CCPERL. Let us rst recall that in the rst-best, rst-period con-
sumptions are distributed among agents only according to their time preferences,
and second-period consumptions are set to zero. Hence, under asymmetric informa-
tion, independently of their survival chance j, only type-1 agents would like to
mimic type-2 agents, so that the second-best allocation now has to also satisfy the
following incentive compatibility constraint,
u (c1j) + j1u (d1j)  u (c2j) + j1u (d2j) , 8j
The rst-best egalitarian-equivalent optimum, with c11 = c12 < c21 = c22 and
dij = 0 for all i; j; is not incentive-compatible because it violates the above condition.
As the Maximin on CCPERL focuses on short-lived agents, it still makes sense to
keep dij = 0, but we now need, in order to satisfy the incentive constraint, to equalize
rst-period consumptions. In sum, the second-best Maximin CCPERL solution is:
c11 = c

12 = c

21 = c

22 > d

11 = d

12 = d

21 = d

22 = 0:
As a consequence, we have
c^211 = c^221 < c^111 = c^121 < c^112 = c^122;
c^211 = c^221 < c^212 = c^222:
21The same reasoning applies for the other trade-o¤s.
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In comparison with the rst-best, it is no longer possible to equalize the consumption-
equivalent of short-lived agents, as this would require consumption inequalities that
violate the incentive-compatibility constraint. Moreover, it is no longer always true
that c^212 and c^222 are the greatest, because now cij = c for all i; j; and 1 < 2.
Let us briey sum up the results of this section.
Proposition 2 Assume that u(0) > 0, and that the social planner faces a unique
intertemporal budget constraint. Under asymmetric information about ex ante types
(i; j):
 Utilitarianism gives a rst-period consumption greater than the second period
consumption to agents with a low patience or low survival probability. For
the other agents, the introduction of incentive constraints pushes towards more
consumption in the second period. Individual bundles should be di¤erentiated
according to their time preference but also according to their survival chance.
We may have pooling for some types.
 Maximin CCPERL involves a perfect equalization of rst-period consumptions
for all agents. Second-period consumptions are all equal to zero.
A common feature of the utilitarian and egalitarian-equivalent solutions is that
consumptions are, under each social objective, not smoothed across time. Never-
theless, second-period consumptions are zero in the egalitarian-equivalent solution,
whereas they are strictly positive under utilitarianism, so that the departure from
a smoothed consumption is much larger under the egalitarian-equivalent solution.
Hence welfare inequalities between short-lived and long-lived agents are larger under
utilitarianism than under the egalitarian-equivalent solution. Moreover, under utili-
tarianism, rst-period consumptions are not equalized across agents, whereas under
the egalitarian-equivalent solution, rst-period consumptions are equalized. This dif-
ference comes from the fact that, under utilitarianism, the distortion induced by the
incentive constraints acts on both rst-period and second-period consumptions. On
the contrary, under the egalitarian-equivalent solution, the distortion must be only
on the rst-period consumption, as changing second-period consumptions would raise
inequalities between short-lived and long-lived agents.
6 Extensions and generalisations
As shown in the previous sections, the Maximin on CCPERL yields rather extreme
solutions. The optimal allocation is a corner solution, as it involves zero second-
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period consumption. In this section, we propose to check whether the specic as-
sumptions we made in Sections 4 and 5 are responsible for this result. For this
purpose, in this section we will relax di¤erent assumptions successively, and discuss
the robustness of the solution to those changes.
Firstly, we will consider more general preferences, by relaxing the assumption of
a positive utility of survival (i.e. u(0) > 0). Secondly, we discuss the possibility
of adopting a reference lifetime ` lower than maximum longevity (i.e. 2 periods).
Finally, while we assumed so far that the social planner controlled the allocation
of resources over time, we will consider the case where agents can freely transfer
resources across periods.
6.1 The utility of survival
Let us rst assume that the utility of zero consumption is zero: u (0) = 0. In this
case, the individual does not gain any utility from his mere survival. Obviously,
Table 1 is independent of the assumption on u (0), so that our previous reasoning
still holds. Thus, in the rst-best egalitarian-equivalent optimum, we obtain that
c11 = c

12 < c

21 = c

22
d11 = d

12 = d

21 = d

22 = 0
The only di¤erence with respect to the case where u(0) > 0 comes from the rank-
ing of agents in terms of CCPERL. We now have that all CCPERL are equalized
across agents with di¤erent lengths of life, di¤erent survival probabilities and di¤er-
ent time preferences, unlike the case with u(0) > 0 (for which long-lived agents had
higher consumption-equivalents). The assumption u(0) = 0 allows for a complete
compensation of short-lived agents.
Let us now turn to the second-best (asymmetric information). As the rst-best
allocation under u(0) = 0 is identical to the one under u(0) > 0, incentive constraints
are also identical, so that it still optimal to provide cij = c
 and dij = 0. Again, only
the ranking in terms of CCPERL changes:
c^111 = c^121 = c^112 = c^122 > c^211 = c^221 = c^212 = c^222
which, looking at Table 1, is a direct consequence of the di¤erences in time prefer-
ences. Our results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Assume that u(0) = 0. In the rst-best, the CCPERL is equalized
across all agents by xing second-period consumption to zero, and by giving a higher
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rst-period consumption to patient agents. In the second-best, the optimal allocation
consists in giving the same rst-period consumption to all agents and zero second-
period consumption.
Let us now turn to the case in which u (0) < 0, and dene d as the level of
consumption such that u (d) = 0. The rst-best optimum still equalizes CCPERL
across all agents, but is now modied. Three cases should be distinguished, depend-
ing on how large the available resources W are.
If W > d [4 + 2 (1 + 2)], it is optimal to x second-period consumptions to
d, and to give a higher rst-period consumption to patient agents. That allocation
equalizes CCPERL across agents with unequal longevities, because living a second
period with d or not is a matter of indi¤erence. Note that, while the positive second-
period consumption induced by u(0) < 0may seem to make the egalitarian-equivalent
solution less "extreme" than before, it remains that this solution only assigns long-
lived agents a consumption that makes their survival equivalent to death. Thus,
even if the Maximin CCPERL seems less extreme than in the benchmark case, the
underlying idea is the same: fully compensating short-lived agents implies making
the survival of long-lived agents worthless. If, alternatively, d2 (1 + 2) < W <
d [4 + 2 (1 + 2)], the Maximin CCPERL gives d as second-period consumption,
and a rst-period consumption lower than d, with a higher level for patient agents.
Finally, if W < d2 (1 + 2)), it is optimal to have a second-period consumption as
close as possible to d, while xing rst-period consumption to 0.
Consider now the asymmetric information context, and focus on the case in which
W > d [4 + 2 (1 + 2)]. The second-best optimum does not necessarily consist in
giving d to all old agents and an identical bundle c to all young agents. Suppose,
for instance that 1 is close to zero. By o¤ering a menu of two bundles, (c
; d) and
(c + "; 0), for a (not too) small ", one may induce the impatient agents to choose
the latter. This frees resources and makes it possible to achieve a larger c than
if the same bundle (c; d) was o¤ered to everyone. The worst-o¤ agents are the
patient agents who choose (c; d), whether they die young or survive, and it is then
worth maximizing c in order to maximize the lowest CCPERL. Note that in this
conguration compensation for a short life is over-achieved among impatient agents:
those who die early are better o¤. Our results are summarized below.
Proposition 4 Assume that u(0) < 0 and that W > d [4 + 2 (1 + 2)]. In the
rst-best, the CCPERL is equalized across all agents by xing the second-period con-
sumption to d, and by giving a higher rst-period consumption to patient agents. In
the second-best, the optimal allocation does not necessarily consist in giving the same
consumption to all young agents and d to all old agents.
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Finally, it should be stressed that the intercept of the temporal utility function
plays a more important role when we consider a general framework with T > 2 life-
periods. Indeed, in that case, a strictly positive intercept u(0) > 0 would, under time-
additive lifetime welfare, lead to large di¤erentials between the welfares of short-lived
and long-lived agents, since the utility frommere survival would accumulate over time
for survivors. Hence, under u(0) > 0, the Maximin CCPERL would only provide
partial compensation. However, if we make the more plausible assumption u(0)  0,
then the extension to T > 2 periods would not prevent a complete compensation to
short-lived agents. In that case, the consumption at all ages beyond the rst deaths
would be equal to subsistence consumption d, yielding, by denition, no welfare
gain from surviving one or many extra life-periods.
A graphical analysis is helpful. We shall focus here on the second-best optimum.
Let us now assume a distribution of  2 ;  and of  2 [; ].22 Incentive
constraints impose to give all agents (who cannot be distinguished ex ante by the
planner) the same budget set, represented by the decreasing line in Figure 4 below.
The optimistic () patient () agents choose the bundle (c; d), that is, from all chosen
bundles, the farthest on the left, while the pessimistic impatient (; ) agents choose
the bundle that is the most on the right.
Let us rst focus on the case in which u(0) = 0, which is illustrated in Figure 4.
The CCPERL index, with ` = 2, is computed as the solution to
u(c^) + u(c^) = u(c) + u(d) if the agent lives two periods,
u(c^) + u(c^) = u(c) if the agent lives one period.
We then compare the welfare of the agents who consume (c; d) and those who
consume c and die. It is clear from above that, for given preferences, the latter are
the worst-o¤ since u(d) > 0 when d > 0. For the short-lived agents, the intersection
between the indi¤erence curve containing the point (c; 0) and the 45 line gives the
level of c^. Graphically, the worst-o¤s, ex post, are those who belong to the
 
; 

group and die young, as they have the smallest c^ (i.e. the closest to the left). The
arrow on the gure shows the CCPERL index for those individuals.23
Let us now consider the case in which u(0) > 0. Again, for given preferences, the
worst-o¤ agents are those who die young (because u(d) > 0). In order to visualize
their situation, it is convenient to extend u () to negative values, and to nd d < 0
22This does not change the analysis as long as we assume that there are agents with characteristics 
; 

.
23In Figure 4, from point (c; 0), we draw the indi¤erence curves of short-lived individuals with
same survival prospects but with di¤erent , to make explicit that individuals with  are worse-o¤
than if they had  (i.e., indi¤erence curves are steeper in the latter case).
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Figure 3: Illustration of the argument when u(0) = 0.
such that u(d) = 0: For short-lived agent one then computes the CCPERL by
solving:
u(c^) + u(c^) = u(c) = u(c) + u(d):
Looking at Figure 5, this corresponds to nding the point (c; d) and drawing the
indi¤erence curve that goes through that point. The intersection with the 45 line
gives the agents CCPERL. Again, ex post, the worst-o¤ are the
 
; 

type who die
young, as again their CCPERL are the closest to the left.
From this graphical analysis, it is easy to recover the analytical results of the
previous section about the second-best policy. Moreover, one can also obtain a simple
way to evaluate arbitrary policies, by observing that the CCPERL of the short-lived 
; 

-type depends only on the rst-period consumption of this type, which is the
lowest by incentive compatibility.
Proposition 5 If u(0)  0; the comparison of two budget sets is made as follows:
the better budget set is the one that induces the larger level of lowest rst-period
consumption.
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Figure 4: Illustration of the argument when u(0) > 0.
Let us nally illustrate the case in which u(0) < 0. We now dene d > 0 such
that u(d) = 0. We rst consider the "normal" case in which all agents choose a
point (c; d) such that c  d and thus u (c) > 0. If d > d, then, for given preferences,
the worst-o¤s are still those who die young, because u(d) > 0. Figure 6 illustrates
that case. If, on the contrary, one had d < d, the worst-o¤ agents would be the
long-lived agents.
When some agents choose (c; d) such that c < d, the worst-o¤ are not neces-
sarily agents with characteristics
 
; 

; depending of the precise conguration, but
certainly the worst-o¤ agents are among those who choose in this way. Indeed, their
CCPERL index is then less than d (whatever the reference longevity), whereas those
who choose (c; d) such that c  d have a CCPERL index at least as great as d:
6.2 Reference longevity
Let us now examine the sensitivity of the Maximin CCPERL solution to the longevity
level chosen as a reference. As shown in Section 3, the CCPERL is constructed for
a particular reference longevity level, at which comparisons in terms of dominance
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Figure 5: Illustration of the argument when u(0) < 0.
of consumption bundles can be made independently of the agentspreferences over
longevity. Given that there are several candidates for the reference longevity level,
it makes sense to study the robustness of our solution to this reference.
Until now, we have assumed that the reference longevity was the maximum length
of life, i.e. ` = 2, and computed the CCPERL for all individuals on the basis of that
reference longevity. Let us now assume, alternatively, that the reference longevity `
is the minimum longevity (i.e. 1 period). Under this assumption, Table 1 becomes:
27
  ` def. CCPERL c^ij`
1 1 1 u (c^111) = u (c11)
1 2 1 u (c^121) = u (c12)
2 1 1 u (c^211) = u (c21)
2 2 1 u (c^221) = u (c22)
1 1 2 u (c^112) = u (c11) + 1u (d11)
1 2 2 u (c^122) = u (c12) + 1u (d12)
2 1 2 u (c^212) = u (c21) + 2u (d21)
2 2 2 u (c^222) = u (c22) + 2u (d22)
Table 2: CCPERL for reference longevity l*=1
For simplicity, we will assume here that u (0) > 0. In order to nd the bundles
maximizing the minimum CCPERL, we rst need to identify the worst-o¤ individ-
uals. Here again it is clear that the long-lived individuals are better-o¤ than the
short-lived individuals. Therefore the optimal allocation must have
d11 = d

12 = d

21 = d

22 = 0
It is also obvious that equalizing the CCPERL of the short-lived individuals is
achieved by equalizing their consumption. One must therefore have
c11 = c

12 = c

21 = c

22 = c

Note that this equalization of all rst-period consumptions di¤ers from what
prevailed under ` = 2, where patient agents received a higher rst-period consump-
tion than impatient agents. The reason is that, when the reference longevity is the
minimum longevity (i.e. under ` = 1), the CCPERL of the short-lived becomes in-
dependent from time preferences, contrary to what was the case when the reference
longevity was assumed to be the maximum longevity. Actually, when the reference
longevity is one period, all short-lived agents become equal, whether they are patient
or not, and this explains why they all have the same compensation.
Note that our rst-best optimum is also incentive compatible, and, therefore,
optimal in the second-best context.
Proposition 6 Assume that u(0) > 0, and that the social planner faces a unique
intertemporal budget constraint. In the rst-best, the Maximin CCPERL under ` =
1 equalizes all rst-period consumptions, and sets all second-period consumptions to
zero. In the second-best, the Maximin CCPERL under ` = 1 coincides with the
rst-best allocation and is exactly the same as under ` = 2.
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In sum, this subsection reveals that the choice of a particular reference longevity
level has some e¤ects on the rst-best egalitarian-equivalent solution, but is less cru-
cial in the second-best context. All in all, one should not exaggerate the inuence of
the reference longevity on the Maximin CCPERL solution. Whatever `, it keeps the
property of decreasing optimal consumption proles, in such a way as to compensate
short-lived agents.24
6.3 Savings
Up to now, we have assumed that agents could not save resources from one period to
the other, or, equivalently, that their savings were controlled by the social planner.
In this section, we relax that assumption and assume that savings are completely
free. For simplicity, we keep the assumption u (0) > 0.
Now the planner must, at the beginning of the rst period, give an endowment
to individuals, which they can freely allocate between their two periods of life. We
denote by Wij the amount of resources the social planner gives to individuals with
time preference factor i and survival probability j.
25
Hence, when the social planner provides Wij to agents, they rst decide how
to allocate it between rst-period and second-period consumptions, by solving the
problem:
maxu (cij) + iju (dij)
s. to cij + dij  Wij;
so that the indirect utility function of a (i; j)-type agent is
Vij (Wij) = u (cij (Wij)) + iju (dij (Wij)) ;
where cij (Wij) ; dij (Wij) are obtained from solving the agents problem. It is clear
from this maximization problem that, if Wij = W for all i; j, we would have
d11 < d12; d21 < d22, as impatient agents with a lower survival probability prefer
to consume more in the beginning of their life. In this alternative setting, we rede-
ne the consumption equivalent c^ij` for each of the 8 groups of agents:
24Similarly, one could explore variants to the reference to a constant consumption in the denition
of CCPERL, without nding much change to the main policy conclusions.
25Note that, since these resources are allocated at the beginning of the rst period, the social
planner cannot distinguish between agents who live long and those who die in the end of the rst
period. This will has consequences on the optimal allocation, as we shall see.
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  ` def. CCPERL c^ij`
1 1 1 u (c^111) (1 + 1) = u (c11 (W11))
1 2 1 u (c^121) (1 + 1) = u (c12 (W12))
2 1 1 u (c^211) (1 + 2) = u (c21 (W21))
2 2 1 u (c^221) (1 + 2) = u (c22 (W22))
1 1 2 u (c^112) (1 + 1) = u (c11 (W11)) + 1u (d11 (W11))
1 2 2 u (c^122) (1 + 1) = u (c12 (W12)) + 1u (d12 (W12))
2 1 2 u (c^212) (1 + 2) = u (c21 (W21)) + 2u (d21 (W21))
2 2 2 u (c^222) (1 + 2) = u (c22 (W22)) + 2u (d22 (W22))
Table 3: Consumption equivalents when individuals can save.
Long-lived agents are better-o¤than short-lived ones given u(0) > 0. The planner
can equalize the CCPERL of the short-lived agents by distributingW11;W12;W21;W22
such that for some ; for all i; j;
u (cij (Wij))
1 + i
= :
As c11(W ) > c12(W ) and c21(W ) > c22(W ); this implies that
W11 < W12 and W21 < W22:
If 12 < 21 (i.e. di¤erences in patience are more important than di¤erences in
survival probabilities), one has c12(W ) > c21(W ): In order to obtain
u (c12 (W12))
u (c21 (W21))
=
1 + 1
1 + 2
;
which implies c12 (W12) < c21 (W21), one must have W12 < W21: In sum, we have
W11 < W12 < W21 < W22:
There are two main di¤erences with respect to the standard case (Section 4.2).
First, the planner now di¤erentiates bundles also with respect to survival probabil-
ities, contrary to the case where agents could not save. The planner now takes into
account that, when agents can transfer resources to the second period, their actual
consumption in the rst period depends both on their time preferences and on their
survival chances. Hence, agents who die early are more penalized by death when
they had better survival prospects because they saved more. Second, inequalities in
CCPERL between short-lived and long-lived agents are larger than in the standard
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case. This is due to the fact that, since Wij is given to agents before they know
their length of life, agents always save some resources for the second period (thus
dij > 0 for survivors). The compensation made by the planner is then limited by
the possibility of individual savings. For the same reason, it is no longer possible to
equalize the CCPERLs of long-lived agents with equal preferences.
Finally, we solve the problem under asymmetric information. If the planner were
to propose the rst-best bundles, individuals would always have interest in claiming
to be a (2; 2)-type agent. Hence, in order to solve the incentive problem, the
optimum requires that the allocation is such that
W 11 = W

12 = W

21 = W

22:
All possibilities of compensatory redistribution are gone in this context. This gener-
ates the following ranking among short-lived agents (assuming 12 < 21):
c^111 > c^121 > c^211 > c^221:
Proposition 7 summarizes our results (compare with Proposition 2):
Proposition 7 Assume that u(0) > 0, and that both the social planner and agents
face a unique intertemporal budget constraint. In the rst-best, the Maximin CCPERL
di¤erentiates individual endowments Wij according to time preferences and survival
probabilities. In the second-best, the Maximin CCPERL gives the same bundle to all.
Assuming that agents can save at the same rate as the government nullies the
possibilities of compensation between long-lived and short-lived agents. This should
be viewed as an extreme case, as the opposite extreme from the assumption that
the agents cannot save at all. In the intermediate case in which the planner can tax
savings and redistribute the proceeds, without being able (for technical or political
reasons) to impose a prohibitive tax, the optimal policy under CCPERL would adopt
the greatest admissible tax in order to maximize rst-period consumptions.
7 Concluding remarks
Can one compensate the dead? Such a compensation seems impossible: short-lived
persons are hard to identify ex ante, and, once dead, it is too late. However, this
study provides a positive answer: one solution is to allocate resources ex ante in such
a way as to maximize the minimum Constant Consumption Prole Equivalent on the
Reference Lifetime. The Maximin CCPERL solution involves, in general, declining
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consumption proles, and provides a full compensation to the short-lived when the
utility from mere survival is non-positive.26
Is the Maximin CCPERL solution applicable, and by means of which instru-
ments? Regarding pensions, our egalitarian-equivalent approach would recommend,
under a Pay-As-You-Go pension system, to reduce contributions from the young,
and to reduce pensions of the elderly to subsistence levels. There would also be
little encouragement for savings, since savings always makes the short-lived worse
o¤. Regarding the age of retirement, our approach would recommend a lifecycle
that di¤ers from the common one. Instead of leaving the enjoyment of retirement to
ages not reached by the worst-o¤s, our approach would recommend an early "break"
period which could be enjoyed by all. Recent protests against raising retirement age
in France did prominently mention the unfair situation of categories of workers who
die earlier than others.
Comparing the Maximin CCPERL solution with the actual consumption proles,
which exhibit, in general, an inverted-U shape (see Lee and Tuljapurkar, 1997),
su¢ ces to show how real economies depart from our egalitarian-equivalent approach
to social justice. Clearly, the rst, increasing part of the actual age-consumption
prole is not hardly compatible with our results. While popular wisdom usually
encourages youngsters to enjoy life when they can, it also carries an "ideal" of a
long and constantly happy life. The ideas of discouraging savings and of favoring
early gifts over bequests (that may come too late) are not common. Our analysis,
however, reveals the hidden unfairness in the prevailing ideal of a long and happy
life. While it is rational for every individual to pursue this ideal, letting all organize
their life around it is the source of deep inequalities due to di¤erential longevity,
and ultimately runs against the ex post, true interests of the unlucky who die young.
Policy-makers generally worry about myopic behaviors and seek ways to encourage
or force people to save for their old age. Myopia, after all, might be the best ally of
fairness for the short-lived.
Applying the Maximin CCPERL would thus lead to a radical change of perspec-
tive and a vast reorganization of the lifecycle. However, such changes may not be
implementable in a political democracy, for several reasons. First, our egalitarian-
equivalent approach would be benecial, ex post, to the short-lived, but these are,
by denition, unable to vote, ex post, in favor of this approach. In particular, young
people may not adhere to the approach because death is a taboo. Even if death is
the only certain event of a life, it remains a thing that people prefer to forget. Third,
our societies are ageing societies, and thus older voters may prefer to improve their
26But welfare di¤erentials between short-lived and long-lived remain otherwise, in particular
under the possibility of individual savings.
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lot, even if this reinforces arbitrary inequalities caused by Nature.
Two important issues have been left for future research. Some longevity inequal-
ities result from individual behaviours, not simply from natural factors. One might
think that, intuitively, risk-taking short-lived agents should be less compensated than
other short-lived persons, as the former are more responsible for their short life than
the latter. Incorporating this element of responsibility in the analysis of compensa-
tion for a short life requires a substantial extension of the setting and a reexamination
of the social objective.
We have also ignored the possibility that the agents derive utility from leaving
a bequest. If an agent who dies young leaves a greater bequest than an otherwise
similar agent who lives longer, the presence of bequest utility achieves a partial
compensation for dying young. If, on the contrary, living longer makes it possible to
accumulate more and leave a greater legacy, then this reinforces the inequalities due
to di¤erential longevity. A serious study of this issue requires a richer model with
production, and also a renement of the Maximin CCPERL criterion.
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9 Appendix: Proof of Theorem 1
Lemma 1 Assume that the social ordering function % satises Axioms 1-2-3 on
<jN j. Then % is such that for all RN 2 <jN j, all xN , yN 2 X jN j, and all i, j 2 N , if
Ri = Rj and
yiPixiPixjPjyj
and xkPkyk for all k 6= i; j, then
xN %RN yN :
Proof. If  (xi) =  (yi) =  (xj) =  (yj) ; the result follows from Fleurbaey and
Maniquet (2011, Lemma A.1).
By assumption on <, there exist xN ; yN such that:
1)  (xi) =  (yi) =  (xj) =  (yj) = T ;
2) yiP 0iyiP
0
ixiP
0
i xiP
0
ixjP
0
jxjP
0
j yjP
0
jyj;
3) xkPkxkPkykPkyk:
By Weak Pareto, xN RN xN et yN RN yN : By the previous step, xN %RN yN :
By transitivity, xN %RN yN :
Lemma 2 Assume that the social ordering function % satises Axioms 1-2-3-4 on
<jN j. Then % is such that for all RN 2 <jN j, all xN , yN 2 X jN j, and all i, j 2 N , if
y^i > x^i > x^j > y^j
and xkPkyk for all k 6= i; j, then
xN %RN yN :
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Proof. The allocations constructed in this proof all involve a longevity equal to `
and a constant consumption for i; j (this will not be repeated below). Let R denote
the Leontief preferences represented by min fxik j xik > 0; 1  k  Tg :
Let z1N ; z
2
N ; z
3
N be such that:
1) z1i > y^i > z
2
i > x^i > z
3
i > x^j > z
3
j > z
2
j > z
1
j > y^j;
2) z2i   z3i = z3j   z2j ;
3) xkPkz3k = z
2
kPkz
1
kPkyk for all k 6= i; j:
Let R0N ; R
00
N be such that:
1) I (xk; R0k) = I (xk; Rk) ; I (yk; R
0
k) = I (yk; Rk) for k = i; j;
2) I (xk; R00k) = I (xk; Rk) ; I (z
1
k; R
00
k) = I (z
1
k; Rk) for k = i; j;
3) I (z1i ; R
0
i) = I (z
1
i ; R
) ; I (z2i ; R
00
i ) = I (z
2
i ; R
) ; and R00i = R
00
j ;
4) R0k = R
00
k = Rk for all k 6= i; j:
Suppose that, contrary to the desired result, one has yN RN xN : By Axiom 2,
yN R0N xN : By Axiom 1, z1N R0N yN and by transitivity, z1N R0N xN : By Axiom 2,
z1N R00N xN : By Lemma 1, z2N %R00N z1N and by transitivity, z2N R00N xN : By Axiom
4, z3N %R00N z
2
N and by transitivity, z
3
N R00N xN : The latter contradicts Axiom 1.
Therefore xN %RN yN :
The rest of the proof of Th. 1 is a standard argument (see Hammond 1979 or
Fleurbaey and Maniquet 2011).
35
